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The Politics 
O f Violence
By Sulayman S. Nyang
S ince the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, this small country in the Middle East has been in the news constantly. 
Scholars and journalists have written 
profusely about the civil war and, most 
recently, about the expulsion of the 
PLO (Palestine Liberation Organiza­
tion) from Lebanon by the Israelis, fol­
lowing the Israeli invasion of the coun­
try. Added to the Israeli invasion was 
the heightening of tensions and violence 
between the two main religious com­
munities in Lebanon, the Muslims and 
the Christians.
What has actually complicated mat­
ters in Lebanon is the history of exter­
nal involvement in this Arab state. 
There was the civil war of 1958 and the 
intervention of the United States on 
behalf of the Lebanese regime. The 
U.S. was also destined to get involved 
again in Lebanon in the 1980s. This 
time, though, the role of the American 
troops was that of a peacekeeper be­
tween the Israelis and the Lebanese 
milita groups who were fighting the 
invading Israelis as well as other 
Lebanese they perceived to be collabo­
rating with the foreign enemy. How­
ever, the U.S. forces ultimately did take 
sides in their bombardment of Leba­
nese “enemy” strongholds.
Background of the Present Conflict
The modem state of Lebanon came into 
being after 1918 following the defeat of 
the Ottoman Empire in World War I, 
first under French mandatory rule from 
1920, and as a soverign state since 
November 1941. Its establishment can­
celled the Mustasarrifiyah system 
which had been adopted in Lebanon in 
the 19th century after the civil war of 
1860. This administrative arrangement 
that granted extended autonomy to the 
Christian inhabitants of Mount Leba-
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non was the result of Western pres­
sures on the Ottoman rulers. The rise of 
Greater Lebanon in 1920 ushered a new 
situation and altered the power balance 
between the various ethnic and relig­
ious groupings within Lebanon. The 
Mustasarrifiyah, which was character­
ized by sectarian homogeneity, was 
replaced by a new arrangement which 
brought under one roof a large number 
of Muslim and Christian sects, none of 
which had an absolute majority. This 
state of affairs was destined to affect 
the course of history in the Arab world; 
that is to say, the expansion of Lebanon 
in 1920 paradoxically sowed the seeds 
of its near destruction since the 
mid-1970s.
Indeed, “the problem of Lebanon 
since 1920 can be described as that of a 
Christian minority, which has tradition­
ally feared political and cultural assim­
ilation and the loss of its national iden­
tity in an Arab Muslim society but 
which, by the realization of its aspira­
tions for an independent state, created 
the problem of a large Muslim minority, 
which itself fears the loss of its own 
identity in an essentially Christian 
Lebanese state.. . ”1
In light of this analysis, one can argue 
that the Lebanese civil war of 1975/76 
was the latest expression of this conflict 
dating back to 1920s when the French 
decided to render to the Maronites of 
Mount Lebanon all that they felt France 
owed to them. Hence the decision to an­
nex the surrounding areas—areas with 
a large Muslim majority. The new state 
of Lebanon incorporated the Beka’a 
Valley, the Akkar region with its large 
Greek Orthodox and Sunni population, 
the southern region of Jabal Amel with 
its predeominantly Shiite population, 
and the western part where the coastal 
Sunni towns of Tripoli and Sidon and 
the major city of Beirut are located.
To many historians, the decision to 
create Greater Lebanon was carefully 
studied by France, with the hope that 
Lebanon could serve as an effective 
French staging ground in the universe 
of Superpower rivalry in the Middle 
East. But the train of historical events 
has not proven policymakers of the 
French Republic correct. Lebanon 
gradually became entangled in the large 
web of Pan Arab politics, and her peo­
ple began to shed blood of then- 
brethren in the name of one sect or the 
other. [Population estim ates of 
Lebanon in 1974, one year before the 
civil war, was 3.1 million, and in 1979 
2.6 million.]
A s a result of the strange way the state of Lebanon came about, the demographic balance was shaken. In 1932 the govern­
ment statistical data gave a breakdown 
of those sects which inhabited Greater 
Lebanon. It showed that the followers 
of Christianity formed a six to five ma­
jority. This ratio, five Muslims to six 
Christians, was the basis of the political 
arrangement between Muslim leaders 
and their Christian counterparts at the 
time of decolonization from France in 
1941.
By adopting the above arrangement, 
the Lebanese leaders introduced into 
their political and social life a Lebanese 
ethnic arithmetical formula that required 
of all government posts to be parcelled 
out according to the proportionate 
representation of a given religious and 
ethnic group in the country. Thus from 
1932 onwards, the Lebanese govern­
ment has learned to come to terms with 
the religious division in the country. To 
institutionalize the division, it made 
sure that a factor of 11 was taken into 
account in the allocation of positions in 
government. Moreover, the Lebanese 
elites agreed amongst themselves that
the President of the country always be a 19 
Christian Maronite, the Prime Minister 
a Sunni Muslim, the Speaker a Shiite 
Muslim, and so on.
One dilemma of the Lebanese leader­
ship since independence has been the 
failure to realize that a rigid mathe­
matical formula can never accommo­
date rising new groups and political 
forces. This sociological fact has 
become evident to all Lebanese since 
the eruption of the 1975 civil war. The 
struggle for authority, power and influ­
ence led to intense and at times deadly 
competition among the Lebanese. 
There was the competition between 
Maronites against other Christians; the 
struggle between the Christians and the 
Muslims; the struggle between Sunnis 
and Shiites. All these, however, took 
place within the framework of the Zaim 
system. Under this political arrange­
ment, each grouping in the country has 
its own leaders, who spoke for then- 
respective communities. Their privilege 
and prestige depended on how they per­
formed before their colleagues and on 
behalf of their communities.2
The sectarian geography of the state of 
Lebanon falls into four major regions:
■ Mount Lebanon, the home base of 
the Maronites, has the largest Christian 
groupings.
■ The Northwestern Region, which ex­
tends from the coast to the western 
mountains, including Tripoli and 
Akkar, with a Sunni Muslim majority.
■  The Northeastern Region, which 
forms the eastern slope of the Akkar 
mountains, northern Beka’a and the 
northern part of Lebanon’s eastern 
mountain range, Ba’albek and Hermil 
fall into this category, with a majority 
Shiite Muslims.
■  The Southern Region, which extends
Geographical Distribution of 
Lebanese Sects
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from the slopes of Jabal Sheikh in the 
east to the Sidon-Tyre coast, with a 
Shiite majority.
B etween these geographical cate­gories, or within them, one finds pockets of the various sects in the country. Three sects have 
the highest dispersion rate. They are 
the Maronites, the Sunnis and the 
Greek Orthodox. The Shiites and the 
Druzes have the lowest. The majority 
of Sunnis are found in major cities like 
Sidon, Beirut and Tripoli. The Maro­
nites, at the beginning of independence 
the majority by plurality, later began to 
migrate to the cities in large numbers.
In looking into the distribution of 
sects across the length and breadth of 
Lebanon, one can argue that the pattern 
of distribution has a logic to it. Accord­
ing to Jamal al-Toubi, “there is a ten­
dency among the Greek Orthodox to 
coexist with the Sunni, the Greek 
Catholic with the Shiite, and the Maro­
nites with the Druze.”3 He goes on to 
assert that this pattern of coexistence 
between Lebanon’s groups was not 
coincidential, rather the result of Mid­
dle East religious history. In the past, 
interaction between sects rarely reached 
beyond commercial transactions or per­
sonal friendships.
Because of the above limitation, one 
may now hold the view that perhaps the 
insistence by Maronites on a sanctuary 
for themselves in the province of Mount 
Lebanon is the result of their realization 
that political power can get back to 
them only when they are in full com­
mand of events in Lebanon. Unlike the 
Shiites who look up to Iran’s Imam 
Khomeini as their spiritual leader, the 
Maronites could count on only those of 
their numbers living in Syria, Cyprus 
and in other places in the Middle East. 
So long as Maronite numerical strength 
remains the same, the Maronite leader­
ship would have no problem sitting 
down with the other Lebanese sectarian 
leaders to resolve common problems.
What has upset this Lebanese polit­
ical applecart? Consider these key 
factors:
The creation of the state of Israel 
made it very difficult for the Lebanese 
to bolt the Arab caravan and work out 
direct and close relationship with the 
West. It is true that some Lebanese fac­
tions would have liked this arrange­
ment, but the forces of history were too 
strong and no Lebanese leader was in a 
position to resist the call for Arab unity 
to tackle the emerging Israeli threat. As 
a result of this development, the Leba­
nese reluctantly joined the Arab caravan 
and so assumed part of the burden of be­
ing a member of the Arab fraternity.
What was the main responsibility of 
the Lebanese leadership in the contest 
of will between the Arabs and the 
Israelis? As fate would have it, the 
Lebanese were pushed forward by 
changing events in the area to serve as 
a host country to the Palestianians— 
those driven out of Palestine by the 
Israelis.
Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, 
a stream of Palestinians began to enter 
Lebanese society. By the time the 1975
The struggle for 
authority, power and 
influence led to intense 
and at times deadly 
competition among the 
Lebanese.
Lebanese civil war exploded, there 
were more than 150,000 Palestinians in 
Lebanon. Initially, most of these men, 
women and children were treated as 
“refugees”. No efforts were made to 
change their conditions. As a result of 
their growing frustration and dissatis­
faction, the process of radicalization 
began to develop among the Palesti­
nians in Lebanon. In 1970, when King 
Hussein of Jordan went on the offensive 
against the Palestinians in his country, 
his actions were the prologue to the real 
and bloody drama in Lebanon. What 
happened in Jordan presaged what later 
developed in Lebanon. The king’s men 
stormed the Palestinian strongholds 
and wiped them out, forcing thousands 
to flee to Lebanon, where they swelled 
the ranks of their compatriots who 
belonged to an earlier generation of 
refugees.
This sudden increase in the number 
of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon was
destabilizing to the Lebanese political 
system and became socially stressful 
due to the increase in conflict between 
the various factions in the Lebanese 
religious system. In retrospect, one can 
argue that the arrival of the Palestinians 
complicated what was already a com­
plex and dangerous social and political 
order in the Middle East.4
The discovery of oil in the Gulf 
states, another key factor, contributed 
to the expansion of the Lebanese econ­
omy. The Gulf leaders saw in Lebanon 
a financial haven for their deposits and a 
place to relax and play. As a result of the 
enormous investments in Lebanon, the 
economy boomed and many Lebanese 
profitted from the changed economic 
conditions. Another important factor 
was the emergence in 1964 of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO).
A s I noted earlier, 1970 was a bad year for the Palestinians. And due to the dissatisfaction of the young Palestinians who were 
denied the right to a homeland, many of 
them decided to take up the challenge 
and wage their own battles with Israel. 
Men like George Habash founded their 
movements and the variegated groups 
within the Palestinian community were 
soon brought together under one roof. 
They set out and launched a series of 
attacks against Israeli or Israeli- 
supported targets. These acts of terror, 
for the first time, drew the attention of 
the world to the plight of the Palesti­
nians who for a long time were treated 
as “refugees”.
The leaders of the United States and 
the world began to pay attention. 
Although in Washington no positive 
response to the PLO was made, there is 
enough evidence to prove that attitudes 
towards and opinions on the Palestinian 
problem changed remarkably. This 
change of image for the Palestinians 
and the PLO had an impact on the 
Lebanese society. Those social groups 
in Lebanon who felt cheated and short­
changed by the system saw an ally in 
the PLO and its leader Yasir Arafat. 
And when the Jordanians drove away 
the Palestinians, many of these 
Lebanese received the fleeing Palesti­
nians with open arms.
The Palestinian Presence
In examining the impact of the Palestin­
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ian presence in Lebanon and the role of 
the Palestinians in the civil war, four 
points can be made here.
First, it should be noted that one can 
discern the mode of perception of the 
various groupings in the Lebanese 
conflict if one analyzes the words used 
for the violent struggle raging in the 
country.
The Maronite leadership perceived 
the struggle as the “war” (al-harb), thus 
emphasizing that it is essentially a 
Lebanese-Palestinian conflict. Those 
Lebanese opposed to the status quo saw 
the conflict as a revolution (al-thawra), 
thereby justifying their support for the 
Palestinians and the need for a political 
reform in their country. The Palesti­
nians who collaborated with the Leba­
nese rejectionists, on the other hand, 
perceived the struggle as a civil war 
(harb-ahliya), thus identifying it as a 
Lebanese-Lebanese fight and not a 
Lebanese-Palestinian conflict.
Second, up to 1982 when the Israelis 
decided to launch operation Peace for 
Galilee, this was how the conflict in 
Lebanon was perceived by the various 
forces in the country. Thus, the Israeli 
factor was minimal. However, it should 
be noted that some of the Christian 
leaders, such as the late Lebanese 
President Bashir Gemayel, collaborated 
with the Israelis before and after their 
1982 invasion of Lebanon. These Maro­
nite Christians saw in Israel a covert if 
not an overt ally in their battle with the 
Palestinians.
The Israeli factor, which Bashir 
Gemayel hoped would enable the Chris­
tians in general, and Maronites in par­
ticular, to establish a separate state 
called the Republic of Juniyah, became 
a liability to the Christians during and 
after the invasion. In retrospect, one 
can now argue that the Israeli invasion 
helped accelerate the process of radical- 
ization among the Lebanese militants. 
Because the Israelis humiliated them, 
many of those Christians who earlier 
rallied around the invaders began to 
waver in their support. Conditions 
deteriorated dramatically following the 
Sabra and Chatila massacres. Israel suf­
fered embarrassment in the interna­
tional community, and Christian 
groups—such as the Phalangists and 
the small militia of Saad Haddad—
became increasingly alienated from 
Israel.
In fact, the conflict between the Phal­
angists and the Israelis predated the 
Sabra and Chatila massacres of Pales­
tinians by pro-Israeli Christian militia. 
In their calculations and preparations 
for the invasion of Lebanon, the Israeli 
strategists factored the Phalangists of 
the late Bashir Gemayel, who was 
assassinated three weeks after his 1981 
election. But the late president, at the 
time just a leader of a major faction, 
found the Israeli proposal unacceptable. 
Not only was he fearful of the conse­
quences of dancing a political tango 
with Israel in public but he and his aides 
soon realized the economic conse­
quences of Israeli penetration of the 
Lebanese market, an important pre-
The sudden increase in 
the number of Pales­
tinian refugees in 
Lebanon was destabiliz­
ing the Lebanese 
political system. . .
serve of the Maronite merchants in 
Beirut. Indeed it is a fact that the Phal­
angists made it a point to warn their 
merchants and shopkeepers in Beirut 
not to buy goods from Israel.
Third, the decision of the Lebanese 
government to give a blind eye to the 
shipment of arms into areas close to the 
Israeli border facilitated the develop­
ment of an arms buildup in the Pales­
tinian strongholds. Added to this was 
the wide circulation of weapons 
throughout the country. Thus when the 
civil war broke out, each community 
and the various militias were virtually 
armed to the teeth. The Palestinians, as 
stockpilers of arms for the struggle 
against the state of Israel, became a 
useful ally to the Lebanese radicals who 
in earlier times suffered at the hands of 
the rulers of the Lebanese state. This 
fact sheds light on the nature of the
Lebanese conflict and the reasons for 
the Israeli invasion.
R elated to the third point is the fourth factor, the Syrian role in the civil war. Syria’s role in the Lebanese crisis was inevitable 
because of a number of reasons. Arab 
nationalists have always dreamed of a 
Greater Syria merger of the states 
which the British and the French seized 
from the faltering Ottoman Empire. 
However, their wish was never to mate­
rialize because neither the Western 
powers nor the Christian minorities in 
the region were sufficiently interested 
in the realization of such a dream. As a 
result, the Syrian leadership decided 
reluctantly to concede the indepen­
dence of Lebanon.
When the civil war broke out, the 
Syrians, who had allies still committed 
to the merger idea, felt it necessary to 
assert their presence. Using geopolit­
ical arguments, they warned the vari­
ous Lebanese parties about the danger 
to Syrian interests and the possibility of 
Israeli manipulation of the crisis. But 
this Syrian concern was not heeded by 
the more powerful groups. At the time, 
each faction was preoccupied with its 
territory and the danger posed to it by 
the rival groups. With the escalation of 
the violence and the greater insecurity 
of the Arab countries and their interests 
in Lebanon, an Arab peacekeeping force 
was hurriedly formed by the Arab 
League. This effort by the League pro­
ved unsatisfactory and in the end the 
Arab states, through the League, 
agreed to leave the peacekeeping func­
tion to Syria. With a mandate to restore 
law and order, the government of Presi­
dent Hafez al-Assad sent troops into 
Lebanon. This was to be the long 
assignment of the Syrian army outside 
its borders. They came, fought and got 
bogged down in the cycle of violence in 
Lebanon. Law was partially maintained 
and order partially restored.
Trying to balance the competing fac­
tions in Lebanon, the Syrians began the 
delicate task of strengthening favorites 
and weakening potential enemies.
While the Palestinian leadership, 
under Yasir Arafat, collaborated with 
Syria, events favored them well in 
Lebanon. This state of affairs continued 
until the Israelis felt that life for Jewish 
settlers in the areas bordering Lebanon 
was no longer bearable.
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Many reasons have been given by the Israelis for their inva­sion of Lebanon. But in retro­spect, one can now argue that 
the Israeli leadership came to realize 
some of its misperceptions and the 
unexpected blunders committed by 
some of its field commanders. The 
Sabra and Chatila massacres became 
the straw that broke the camel’s back. 
As a result of worldwide outcry, the 
Israeli government decided to make 
certain changes in policy. And it ac- 
22 cepted the resignation of Defense 
Minister Ariel Sharon, following in­
vestigation by a blue ribbon panel.
The Role of Fundamentalists
Up until the eruption of the Iranian 
Revolution in 1979, the Shiites in 
Lebanon were the invisible men of the 
Lebanese society. Relegated to lower 
status in the social hierarchy and con­
demned to play second fiddle to the 
Christian and Sunni Muslim fellow citi­
zens, they lived very much in poverty 
and rage. The outbreak of the civil war 
transformed their community from a 
passive into an active/assertive one. 
Allied to the Palestinians in their strug­
gle for respectability in Lebanese soci­
ety and looking for opportunities for 
themselves, they set out to create their 
own political niche in Lebanon. But 
when the Palestinians were routed by 
Israeli troops, some of the Shiite lead­
ers and villagers began to collaborate 
with the Israelis.
The Israelis saw the Shiites and other 
minorities in Lebanon as potential allies 
against the Syrians, the Palestinians 
and the Sunni Muslims. Thus when 
Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, the 
Israeli commanders made it clear that 
they were in search of local Lebanese 
collaborators.
The Israelis, who long before the civil 
war had established contacts with 
Christian rightists in Lebanon, were 
seeking Shiite and Druze Lebanese to 
work with them against the Pales­
tinians and the Syrians. Some of the 
Shiites agreed to cooperate and were 
thus provided with a steady flow of 
arms. But unknown to the Israelis, the 
Shiites were playing the age-old game 
of tahiya (holy deception) with their 
Israeli benefactors. Arms furnished to 
Shiites in the Souf region of Lebanon 
found their way into Beirut and soon
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Israeli soldiers were being killed with 
arms supplied by their government.
It was indeed this state of affairs that 
made the Israeli invasion a trap. Be­
tween September 1982 and November 
1983, the Israelis suffered more than 
147 fatalities in Lebanon. This figure 
may be insignificant to an American but 
any self-respecting Israeli leader cannot 
tolerate such statistics. It was owing to 
this shifting fortune in Lebanon that the 
Israeli leaders decided to wring conces­
sions from the Lebanese regime, this 
time headed by President Amin 
Gemayel.
The Lebanese government, banking 
on full U.S. support, engaged in the 
politics of foot-dragging and as a result 
stalled talks with Israel. The Israelis 
kept on putting more pressure and 
finally got an agreement worked out for 
a conditional pullback of Israeli troops. 
But as history would have it, this was a 
temporary victory. The agreement was 
rejected by many Lebanese, who saw it 
as the beginning of the end of the inde­
pendence of their country. The Syrians, 
who have a vested interest in Lebanon, 
decided to wage a campaign of vilifica­
tion and subversion of the agreement.
The pressure was on the Gemayel government, which in the end unilaterally abrogated the agree­ment.5 This was a shock to the 
Israelis and the Israeli government 
issued a strong warning to the Leba­
nese about the dangers involved in such 
an act. However, nothing happened 
from the Israeli side.
Other factors must have affected the 
Gemayel decision. The Syrian pressure 
was high but the deterioration in the 
military and political power of the Pha- 
langists and the untenability of any 
close association with Israel most likely 
influenced President Gemayel and his 
advisers. And, bent on avoiding the 
destiny of his late brother but deter­
mined to work closely with both the 
U.S. and Syria, Amin Gemayel took the 
decision that for him was the path of 
sanity and survivability.
Because of the deterioration in the 
power of the central government in 
Beirut and the increasing strength of 
the various factions, the Shiites and the 
other fundamentalists began to assert 
themselves more visibly.
The creation of an Islamic state in 
Iran made it possible for the Lebanese
Shiites to have a powerful Big Brother 
in the neighborhood. Prior to the 1979, 
the government of the Shah did not pay 
particular attention to the fortunes of 
the Shiites in other parts of the Middle 
East. This was not to be the case with 
the Khomeini regime.
Since the Iranian revolution, many 
Lebanese Shiites have made pilgrim­
ages to Iran to re-establish contacts 
with their fellow Shiites. Because of 
these contacts, the Shiites in Lebanon 
soon began to build stronger and more 
powerful alliances with other radical
The Israeli factor, 
which Bashir Gemayel 
hoped would enable the 
Christians. . .  to establish 
a separate state. . .  
became a liability. . .
groups in the Middle East. True, radi­
cal Muslim groups existed in Lebanon 
prior to the outbreak of the civil war but 
their impact was virtually nil. The ap­
parent secularism of the pre-war period 
made them irrelevant in Lebanese 
society.
Conditions changed for the better for 
the fundamentalist groups in Lebanon 
during the late 1970s when the radical- 
ization process as well as the eruption 
of the Iranian revolution made it appeal­
ing to assert openly one’s fundamental­
ist allegiance. Hence the emergence of 
the more Islamized segment of the 
Amal and the more fundamentalist 
Hizbullah.6 These two groups are simply 
the coordinators of the activities among 
the various Shiite and fundamentalist 
groups in the area. They may have con­
trol over some of the groups but each 
group has its agenda and its own per­
sonnel.
The U.S. Role
The United States became a factor in 
Lebanon only after the Second World 
War. But American missionaries and 
merchants plied the seas and took risks
working in the Levant long before the 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. In 
fact, the irony is, the leaders of the PLO 
which the U.S. does not recognize are 
the intellectual products of the 
American University of Beirut, a legacy 
of American missionary labor and phil­
anthropy. Regardless of this manifesta­
tion of history’s game of anomalies and 
ironies in human society, a good look at 
the American record in Lebanon is in 
order. First, be it noted that the initial 
American military involvement was in 
1958, in response to a call from then 
President Camille Chamoun. Threat­
ened by the rising forces of Arab 
nationalism under Egypt’s Gamal 
Abdul Nassar and determined to face 
the challenge, President Chamoun ap­
pealed to the late U.S. President 
Dwight Eisenhower. Approximately 
10,000 American troops went to his 
rescue in July 1958, and law and order 
was restored. America’s prestige was 
universally recognized and the Ameri­
can troops returned home a short time 
later, standing tall.
During the second American involve­
ment in the 1980s, the picture seems to 
have changed radically. Two things ex­
plain this development. First, the civil 
war had changed the Lebanese mental­
ity from what it was in the 1950s. In­
stead of a people led by Zaims (tradi­
tional leaders), the Lebanese the Ameri­
cans encountered in 1983 were tough, 
opportunistic, assertive and fanatically 
committed to one ideology or the other. 
Second, American prestige in Lebanon 
and elsewhere was devalued by the 
Vietnam syndrome. For this reason, out­
siders were more willing to challenge 
America’s right to be the policeman of 
the world.
In Lebanon, Islamic fundamentalism, 
for the most part, contributed very 
much to the changed attitudes of the 
average Muslim Lebanese, Sunni or 
Shiite. Emboldened by the success of 
the Iranian militants and reassured of a 
life after death by their mullahs, many 
of the Shiites in Lebanon fought the 
Americans and the Israelis with the 
firm belief that a jihad (holy war) 
against America or Israel was not only 
rewarding spiritually but materially 
significant.
To the Shiites of the Amal, a chal­
lenge to the U.S. was the beginning of 
the end of Christian hegemony in Leba-
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non. The argument is made that “we 
lick the Yankee protector of Maronite 
privilege, then the Maronite would 
sooner or later come to terms with us.” 
This is a powerful argument. The only 
way one can refute it, perhaps, is to pay 
the same price that the holder is willing 
to pay. That is, the will to die at any 
time for a cause. Not many Lebanese 
Christians are that committed. Hence 
the exodus of many Christians from 
Lebanon to the U.S. and other points in 
the world. Because of this emigration, 
24 some analysts are convinced that the 
Shiites are now close to 40 percent of 
the Lebanese population. These statis­
tics are difficult to prove because Leba­
non has not conducted a census since 
1932.
The politics of numbers has been a thorn in the Lebanese body poli­tic and, as is true of pluralistic societies, its leaders are reluctant 
to face the uncertainty of a head count. 
Even if one does not accept the figure 
bandied about in certain circles about 
the strong Shiite presence in Lebanon, 
one must concede that over the past 18 
months the Shiites have made their 
point to the U.S. and to the rest of the 
world, particularly to the Gemayel 
regime.
President Reagan reminded the 
American public, in a letter to Congress 
dated March 30, 1984, that American 
participation in the multinational force 
(MNF) resulted in “grievous losses” in 
terms of 264 military personnel killed 
and 137 wounded in service. This act of 
terror against the U.S. was perpetrated 
by one of the radical groups operating 
in Lebanon.7
To add insult to injury, they also kid­
napped a number of American civilians 
and most gruesomely assassinated one 
of the best friends of the Arabs among 
American scholars, Malcolm Kerr. (A 
distinguished scholar with a charming 
personality, Kerr went to Lebanon to 
take up the presidency of the American 
University of Beirut. He was very 
enthusiastic about his mission when I 
last saw him at a conference at Duke 
University.) Thus Malcolm Kerr, too, 
was a victim of the cycle of violence in 
Lebanon.
Many more Americans died or were 
injured as a result of the irrational war 
in this once peaceful land. But what fur­
ther created a serious problem for the
Reagan administration was the recent 
hijacking [to Beirut] of a Trans World 
Airlines jet on a flight from Athens to 
Rome. Hostages were taken and one 
American serviceman killed. The 
hijackers demanded the immediate 
release of more than 700 Shiites who 
were taken to Israel and imprisoned by 
the Israelis at the time of their with­
drawal from southern Lebanon. In 
assessing the causes and consequences 
of the hijacking, one can put forth four 
points.
The Syrians came as a 
peacekeeping force, but 
in the very execution of 
that task they created 
enemies and further 
compounded the 
problem.
First, the groups that claimed respon­
sibility for the hijacking belonged to 
small splinter associations within the 
Lebanese fundamentalists. Clouded in 
secrecy, and ruthless in their dealings 
with the external forces, these clandes­
tine groups have been difficult to pene­
trate. As a result, they have been able 
to operate with impunity within Leba­
non. This was very evident during the 
recent hostage crisis.
Second, this group or any other clan­
destine operation usually has foreign or 
local financial backers. And since these 
backers are, in most instances, at 
loggerheads with the U.S. or its allies in 
the Middle East, they care very little 
about the outcome of their clients’ acts 
of terror. This has become very evident 
in the last 20 years, as the acts of terror­
ism became the work of both govern­
ments and private dissident groups.
Third, the lower social and political 
status of the Shiites in Lebanon has 
made them quite willing to upset the 
Lebanese balance of power. They had 
so little to lose.
Fourth, sensing the close alliance be­
tween Syria and Iran, the Shiites feel 
that Big Brother Syria can be very help­
ful in the future distribution of
resources and political power in Leba­
non. Hence the opportunistic game of 
taking two steps towards Damascus 
and moving one step backwards 
towards Beirut.
Conclusions
The Lebanese situation involves a host of forces, each with its own particular agenda. Added to this is the role of external forces. 
Given this reality, I offer the following 
conclusions:
■ The current Lebanese crisis which 
started in 1975 went through three 
phases.
First, it began as a struggle for power 
between some Lebanese factions but 
soon deteriorated into a conflict be­
tween the radicals and the status quo 
defenders.
Second, the struggle became more 
complicated with the intrusion of 
regional powers such as Syria and 
Israel. These two countries, trying to 
capitalize on the confusion in this small 
country, exacerbated the conflict.
The Syrians came as a peacekeeping 
force, but in the very execution of that 
task they created enemies and further 
compounded the problem.
The Israelis, on the other hand, came 
to Lebanon as invaders because they 
felt their national interest was threat­
ened. Hence Operation Peace for 
Galilee. This act of self-interest on the 
part of the government of then Prime 
Minister Menachem Begin backfired 
with the discovery of the Sabra and 
Chatila massacres, an atrocity which 
was not committed by the Israelis but 
got Israel’s reputation tainted through 
association with Lebanese renegades 
such as Saad Haddad and his Christian 
militia.
The Israelis tried to clean their image 
immediately by setting up a Commis­
sion of Enquiry and later by asking for 
the resignation of Ariel Sharon.
Third, the struggle in Lebanon pro­
gressed a stage further when the com­
bination of the radicalization process 
and the emergence of Islamic funda­
mentalism made the appearance of 
small terroristic bands fashionable. 
Hence the internationalization of the 
Lebanese crisis.
■ The Lebanese crisis made it clear 
that in this age of nuclear weapons, a 
small band of guerrillas/terrorists can
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render big arms irrelevant. The way in 
which the U.S. hurriedly retreated from 
Lebanon, and the large number of casu­
alties suffered by the Israelis, makes it 
clear that more attention must be given 
to dissident groups in the formulation of 
strategy and policy.
■ The level of violence in Lebanon has 
reached a point whereby death is com­
monplace and life is precarious in the 
streets of Beirut and other cities and 
towns. Because of this development, 
one wonders how the international 
powers can help in the stabilization of 
Lebanon.
■ Due to the changed situations in 
future political arrangements, the 
Shiites and the Druzes must be taken 
into account. They have both amassed 
much power in Lebanon, and then- 
capacity to inflict pain and fear makes
them both dangerous and politically 
worthy of negotiation.
Ironically, one may conclude, it took 
Israel’s invasion for the Shiites to 
replace the Palestinians in the Lebanese 
situation as a community of well-armed 
people in a position to extract conces­
sions hitherto unthinkable. □  *12
Sulayman S. Nyang, Ph.D. is associate professor 
of government and public administration at 
Howard University.
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